The Dictator's Handbook
Political survival depends on sustaining a necessary coalition, shaping how rulers distribute private benefits and public goods.
The authors analyse leadership through incentives for remaining in office.
A leader may praise the public while depend on a much smaller group. The framework asks whose support is necessary, making incentives visible beneath the language of good intentions.
A winning coalition contains supporters necessary to preserve authority.
Its size affects how benefits are distributed.
Small coalitions can favour selective rewards.
Broader coalitions can make public goods more useful politically.
The explanation is deliberately simplified. It can reveal why benefits are distributed selectively without proving that survival in office is the only motive behind every political decision.
Institutional rules alter who can withdraw support.
Foreign aid and resources may change dependence on citizens.
The framework compares democracies, dictatorships, and other organisations.
It simplifies motives and does not explain every political decision.
Its central claim concerns incentives rather than leaders' advertised virtues.