The Social Contract
Political legitimacy rests on collective sovereignty directed toward the common interest, not merely superior force or private advantage.
Force alone does not create a legitimate right to rule. Rousseau asks how association can protect people while allowing them to remain participants in the laws governing them.
Voting for a private advantage is not automatically the same as reasoning about a shared good. Rousseau places that difference at the centre of what makes collective authority legitimate.
The social contract forms a collective body whose sovereignty belongs to the people. The general will concerns the common interest, distinct from a mere total of competing private preferences.
Government administers the political order but is not identical to the sovereign people. Laws should address general conditions rather than become tools for particular factions.
Civic formation and suitable institutions are necessary for collective freedom. The account creates a continuing danger when someone claims exclusive authority to identify the general will and treats dissent as failure to be genuinely free.
A majority's preference can differ from the common interest itself.
The danger comes when someone announces that only they know the common interest. A language of freedom can become coercive if disagreement is treated as proof that people misunderstand themselves.
Political freedom is connected to participation in general lawmaking.
Factions can distort deliberation by organising private interests as public claims.
The size and circumstances of a community affect suitable institutions.
Civil religion raises tensions between shared commitments and freedom of conscience.
Sovereignty cannot simply be transferred to rulers without changing its meaning.