What We Owe the Future
MacAskill argues that the interests of future people should influence present decisions about civilization's risks and long-term direction.
William MacAskill argues that future people matter morally even though they cannot vote, bargain, or tell present institutions what they need.
Maintaining a public archive benefits people whose questions are not yet imaginable. This modest example shows how preserving options can serve the future without claiming to know the exact discoveries later generations will make.
His defense of longtermism asks how decisions made now could affect not only coming decades but the much longer possible history of humanity.
One concern is preventing existential catastrophes that could end or permanently curtail humanity's future. The book considers threats such as engineered pandemics and dangerous technological developments.
Another concern is the persistence of values. Institutions and technologies might make particular arrangements difficult to change, extending today's moral failures or achievements far beyond their original setting.
MacAskill uses historical change to challenge the idea that current values are final. Future generations may view some accepted practices with the disapproval we direct toward earlier injustices.
A proposal with enormous predicted future benefits still needs scrutiny of how it produces them. Very large stakes can make evidence more important, not less, especially when current people bear definite costs for uncertain gains.
Uncertainty is substantial because long-range outcomes are hard to predict. The argument therefore includes moral reflection, risk assessment, and attempts to identify actions robust across different possible futures.
Improving institutions, reducing catastrophic risks, and preserving opportunities for later people can matter without knowing exactly what their lives or priorities will look like in detail.
Critics question speculative estimates, the concentration of influence among wealthy advocates, and whether distant benefits can distract from urgent present suffering or justify unacceptable tradeoffs.
These objections are not answered merely by noting that the future could contain many people. The reliability of causal claims and the fairness of present decisions remain essential.
The book enlarges the circle of responsibility while leaving a demanding balancing problem: care for the future must be pursued through choices that remain accountable to people living now.
How could institutions represent future people's interests while preventing speculative promises from overriding the rights and urgent needs of those alive today?